Honeypot data
The honeypot fields
What each value in the honeypot data means, and how far to trust it.
This page lists every field the honeypot API returns, and what to keep in mind when you use it.
Where the data comes from
A sensor is a small program on a server that pretends to be something worth attacking: an SSH or Telnet login, a web server, a Windows file share or remote desktop, or a database. It accepts what it is sent, never runs or fetches anything, and tells this site what happened. Each thing it reports is an event.
Event fields
| Field | Type | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
id |
integer | The order the site stored the event in. Use it as a cursor |
event_id |
string | A unique id from the sensor. Together with sensor it is unique |
time |
string | When it happened, in UTC, as the sensor saw it |
sensor |
string | Which sensor saw it |
session_id |
string | The same for everything one connection did |
type |
string | What happened. See the types below |
service |
string | Which decoy: ssh, telnet, http, rdp, smb, mssql, winrm, redis or elasticsearch |
ip, port |
string, integer | The address and port the attacker connected from |
country, continent |
string | Two-letter codes |
city, subdivision, postal, timezone |
string | Where the address is registered or routed, from the MaxMind GeoLite2 City database. Often empty |
accuracy_km |
integer | How far off the location may be, as MaxMind estimates it |
latitude, longitude |
number | The middle of the area above |
asn, network |
integer, string | The network number and the name of the network's owner. This is the closest thing to an ISP in the data |
stage |
string | How far along an attack looks: recon, access, discovery, collection or delivery |
actor |
string | bot or human, judged from how fast and regularly input arrives. Often empty early in a session |
username, password |
string | What was typed at a login. See below |
details |
object | A few extra values, by event type (below). Empty for most events |
Event types
| Type | Meaning |
|---|---|
new_attacker |
The first time this sensor saw this address |
login_attempt |
A username and password (or key) was tried |
login_success |
The decoy accepted a login. It lets anyone in after a few attempts, so this is not a measure of how weak a password is |
command |
Something was typed in the decoy shell, or sent to a decoy web server. The content is not in the API |
file_download |
The attacker asked the decoy to download something. Nothing is ever fetched, and the address is not in the API |
payload_captured |
The attacker sent a file. details has its sha256 and size |
bait_read |
The attacker opened a bait file in the decoy |
session_end |
A connection closed. details has seconds and events |
details
| Event type | Keys |
|---|---|
login_attempt |
method (password, publickey or rdp-cookie), and key (a SHA-256 fingerprint) for a public key attempt |
payload_captured |
sha256, size (bytes) |
session_end |
seconds, events |
Things to keep in mind
- Usernames and passwords are whatever the attacker typed. Most are guesses from word lists, but some are real credentials from leaks, and some are real people's. Treat the data as sensitive, keep it secure, and read the terms.
- An address is not a person. Most attacking addresses are hacked devices, rented servers or proxies. Do not take action against an address's owner on this data alone.
- Locations are approximate. City and postal code are where an address is registered, often tens to hundreds of kilometers from the machine. Many are empty.
- Passwords can contain any bytes. Sensors send them as text, with invalid sequences repaired and NUL bytes removed.
- Late events. A sensor that was offline sends its events when it is back, so
timecan be hours older than theidsuggests. - Gaps. A sensor drops events if it cannot reach this site for long enough, so counts are a lower bound.
Stuck on a step?
Create a free account to ask the community. Members who run the real thing answer questions every day.