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Honeypot data

The honeypot fields

What each value in the honeypot data means, and how far to trust it.

This page lists every field the honeypot API returns, and what to keep in mind when you use it.

Where the data comes from

A sensor is a small program on a server that pretends to be something worth attacking: an SSH or Telnet login, a web server, a Windows file share or remote desktop, or a database. It accepts what it is sent, never runs or fetches anything, and tells this site what happened. Each thing it reports is an event.

Event fields

Field Type Meaning
id integer The order the site stored the event in. Use it as a cursor
event_id string A unique id from the sensor. Together with sensor it is unique
time string When it happened, in UTC, as the sensor saw it
sensor string Which sensor saw it
session_id string The same for everything one connection did
type string What happened. See the types below
service string Which decoy: ssh, telnet, http, rdp, smb, mssql, winrm, redis or elasticsearch
ip, port string, integer The address and port the attacker connected from
country, continent string Two-letter codes
city, subdivision, postal, timezone string Where the address is registered or routed, from the MaxMind GeoLite2 City database. Often empty
accuracy_km integer How far off the location may be, as MaxMind estimates it
latitude, longitude number The middle of the area above
asn, network integer, string The network number and the name of the network's owner. This is the closest thing to an ISP in the data
stage string How far along an attack looks: recon, access, discovery, collection or delivery
actor string bot or human, judged from how fast and regularly input arrives. Often empty early in a session
username, password string What was typed at a login. See below
details object A few extra values, by event type (below). Empty for most events

Event types

Type Meaning
new_attacker The first time this sensor saw this address
login_attempt A username and password (or key) was tried
login_success The decoy accepted a login. It lets anyone in after a few attempts, so this is not a measure of how weak a password is
command Something was typed in the decoy shell, or sent to a decoy web server. The content is not in the API
file_download The attacker asked the decoy to download something. Nothing is ever fetched, and the address is not in the API
payload_captured The attacker sent a file. details has its sha256 and size
bait_read The attacker opened a bait file in the decoy
session_end A connection closed. details has seconds and events

details

Event type Keys
login_attempt method (password, publickey or rdp-cookie), and key (a SHA-256 fingerprint) for a public key attempt
payload_captured sha256, size (bytes)
session_end seconds, events

Things to keep in mind

  • Usernames and passwords are whatever the attacker typed. Most are guesses from word lists, but some are real credentials from leaks, and some are real people's. Treat the data as sensitive, keep it secure, and read the terms.
  • An address is not a person. Most attacking addresses are hacked devices, rented servers or proxies. Do not take action against an address's owner on this data alone.
  • Locations are approximate. City and postal code are where an address is registered, often tens to hundreds of kilometers from the machine. Many are empty.
  • Passwords can contain any bytes. Sensors send them as text, with invalid sequences repaired and NUL bytes removed.
  • Late events. A sensor that was offline sends its events when it is back, so time can be hours older than the id suggests.
  • Gaps. A sensor drops events if it cannot reach this site for long enough, so counts are a lower bound.

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