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Spotting Beaconing in a Packet Capture, and What Normal IoT Chatter Looks Like

RackGhostDwayne OP
#1

The question: how do you tell from a packet capture whether a device is beaconing out to a suspicious address, and what does an ordinary IoT device look like by comparison? I would like to compare methods, because most of what I see written on this skips the part where you learn what normal looks like first.

The short answer is that you cannot judge a device's traffic until you have a baseline. A smart plug that talks to a cloud service every thirty seconds is not suspicious. The same plug talking to an address in a country you have no reason to talk to, at a perfectly steady interval, at 3 a.m., deserves a closer look. The difference is context, and context comes from watching the device when you believe it is healthy.

What normal IoT chatter tends to look like

  • A DNS lookup for a small number of vendor hostnames, repeated on a schedule or after a reboot.
  • NTP requests to a public time server or the vendor's own.
  • A long-lived TLS connection to one cloud endpoint, with small keepalive packets.
  • Occasional local traffic: mDNS, SSDP, or DHCP renewals.

The pattern is narrow. Few destinations, few protocols, small packets. If a device does something outside that list, write it down and find out why.

What beaconing tends to look like

Beaconing is regular, small, and persistent. A client checks in with a server at a fixed or nearly fixed interval, sends a little data, and goes quiet again. Things I look for:

  1. Connections to the same destination at evenly spaced intervals. Some malware adds random jitter, so "almost regular" counts.
  2. Packets of nearly identical size in each exchange.
  3. A destination that the device never looked up by name, meaning a bare IP address with no preceding DNS query.
  4. DNS queries for long, random-looking hostnames, or a high volume of queries to one domain.
  5. Traffic on odd ports, or TLS on a port where you would not expect it.

None of these proves anything alone. Plenty of legitimate software polls on a timer. A weather widget is regular too. Regularity is a reason to ask a question, not a verdict.

A starting point

Capture at the firewall or a mirror port, filtered to the one device, so you are not drowning in noise:

tcpdump -i igb1 -w camera.pcap host 192.168.30.45

Then list the conversations and the DNS names it asked for:

tshark -r camera.pcap -q -z conv,tcp
tshark -r camera.pcap -Y dns.flags.response==0 -T fields -e dns.qry.name | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn

To check timing, export the frame times for one destination and look at the gaps between them. A column of nearly identical gaps is the thing you are hunting for.

One caution. Encrypted traffic hides the content, so you are judging behavior, not payload. I cannot tell you that timing analysis alone is enough to call a device compromised, and I would not claim it is. It tells you where to look next.

Two questions for the group. How long do you capture to build a baseline before you trust it? And do you do this at the firewall, or do you run a dedicated mirror port? Report back.

PriyaInTheCloset
#2

Good point on baselining first. Two things I'd add from the homelab side.

Capture where the device lives. If IoT sits on its own VLAN, capture at the firewall interface or a mirror port, filtered by MAC so DHCP changes don't break it:

tcpdump -i igb1 -w plug-baseline.pcap ether host aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff

Then leave it for a week or two, not an hour. A 24-hour check-in or a firmware poll won't show up in a short sample.

Regular interval alone isn't a verdict. Healthy keepalives are also metronomic, so I treat it as a reason to look, not a conclusion. These tend to be more useful:

  • First-seen destinations versus the baseline, with the DNS name attached.
  • Devices skipping your resolver and hitting a hardcoded 8.8.8.8, or using DoH. That's a firewall rule problem, not necessarily malware, but it hides the names you need.
  • Byte counts that drift upward while the interval stays the same.

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